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Few states rely on tourism more heavily than Hawaii. Over 14% of the state’s 
labor force is employed in the arts, entertainment, and recreation industry or the 
accommodation and food services industry. This figure is 5.5 percentage points above the 
national average and second only to Nevada. Another 2.7% of the labor force is 
employed in related transportation fields, the highest percentage in the country (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, 2008). Indeed, the very name of Hawaii’s Department of Business, 
Economic Development, and Tourism shows the significance of the industry to the 
overall economic climate in the state. 
The Hawaii Tourism Authority (HTA), was established 1998 “as the lead state 
agency for Hawaii’s visitor industry. This same act also established the Tourism Special 
Fund, a set percentage of transient accommodations tax collections that is assessed on 
hotels, vacation rentals and other accommodations. The HTA uses this fund to market, 
develop and support Hawaii’s visitor industry. Among its responsibilities as the state’s 
tourism agency, the HTA is charged with the following: 
•  setting tourism policy and direction from a statewide perspective; 
•   developing and implementing the state’s tourism marketing plan and efforts; 
•   administering programs and activities to sustain a healthy visitor industry;  
•   developing and monitoring implementation of the State Tourism Strategic Plan; 
•   coordinating tourism-related research, planning, promotional, and outreach 
activities with the public and private sectors. (HTA, 2007, pg. 3) 
  In 2007, the HTA’s budget was roughly $70 million, the majority of which ($37.5 
million) was devoted to general marketing towards leisure visitors. Over 10% of the 
  2agency’s budget ($7.7 million) was dedicated specifically to sports marketing. HTA gave 
assistance to a variety of sporting events in 2007, including canoe racing, fishing, surfing 
championships, and a volleyball tournament (HTA, 2007). The agency also subsidizes a 
series of Professional Golfers Association (PGA) tournaments, the Ironman Triathlon, 
and a college bowl game (the Hawaii Bowl). The largest event hosted by the HTA is the 
National Football League’s (NFL) Pro Bowl, an annual game between all-star teams from 
each conference which takes place after the Super Bowl in late January or early February. 
Not only is the Pro Bowl the state’s marquee event, it also consumes a disproportionate 
amount of the HTA’s annual budget. In 2004, the agency paid the NFL $5.3 million for 
the rights to host the game, compared with $2.1 million for its slate of PGA tournaments, 
and $585,000 for all other events combined  (Schaefers, 2004).  
This raises two questions. First, is the public funding for promotion and attraction 
of sports tourism well spent? Second, is the amount spent efficiently allocated across 
events?  We use daily airplane arrival data from Hawaii’s Department of Business, 
Economic Development, and Tourism to determine the net change in tourism for a 
variety of sporting events. Daily arrival data allows us to isolate the impact of these 
sporting events, while controlling for the typical fluctuations that occur across different 
months and days of the week. Although arrival data prevent us from estimating the dollar 
impact, which is the more relevant indicator of economic success, we find two events 
generate a positive and significant net impact on arrivals: Honolulu Marathon and Pro 
Bowl. We estimate that the Honolulu Marathon produces 2,183 to 6,519 in net arrivals 
while the Pro Bowl attracts about 5,595 to 6,725 in net arrivals. At the upper end of our 
estimates, the Honolulu Marathon and the Pro Bowl attract a nearly identical number of 
  3visitors despite the fact that the HTA spends nearly two-thirds of its budget on the rights 
to the Pro Bowl and spends nothing for the Hawaii Marathon. Neither event attracts the 
number of net arrivals claimed by its sponsor, and other sporting events do not generate 
any identifiable impact on tourist arrivals whatsoever.  
 
Background 
  The HTA justifies spending on sporting events on three grounds. First, they 
contend that these events attract athletes, spectators, officials, and media which increases 
revenue for Hawaiian accommodations, restaurants, and retail establishments. For 
example, the HTA estimated that the 2007 Pro Bowl attracted 27,625 visitors to Hawaii 
resulting in $28.03 million in visitor spending and $2.72 million in tax collections. (HTA, 
2007, pg. 22)  Second, the HTA suggests that sporting events serve to publicize Hawaii to 
prospective tourists. “The positive media and publicity generated from national and 
international TV/ media coverage promotes Hawaii as a desirable sports venue and an 
attractive visitor destination.” (HTA, 2007, pg. 22) Third, these events may improve the 
quality of life of the Island’s residents by allowing them opportunities to watch or 
participate in major sporting events. 
Sports economists have frequently dealt with similar claims. The question of 
whether sporting events directly lead to increases in economic activity has been the most 
widely explored in this literature. As opposed to economic impact studies commissioned 
by the sports teams or leagues, independent economists examining an area’s economy 
before, during, and after major sporting events tend to find little or no economic impact 
  4from hosting major events. Economists cite three primary reasons for the lack of 
economic impact: the substitution effect, crowding out, and leakages. 
The substitution effect occurs when consumers spend money at a mega-event 
rather than on other goods and services in the local economy. A local Hawaii resident 
who goes to the Pro Bowl or a PGA tournament is spending money at the event that 
likely would have been spent elsewhere in the local economy in the absence of the game. 
Therefore, the local consumer’s spending on a sporting event is not new economic 
activity, rather a reshuffling of local spending. For this reason, most economists advocate 
that spending by local residents be excluded from any economic impact estimates, and 
the HTA’s own reports on the economic impact of the Pro Bowl mention only the 27,000 
visitors to the Islands, not the remaining 23,000 locals who fill out the rest of the 50,000 
total spectators for the game (HTA, 2007). 
  Even including only out-of-region visitors in impact studies may still result in 
inflated estimates if a large portion of the non-local fans at a game are “casual visitors,” 
that is out-of-town guests who go to a sporting event, but are visiting the host city for 
reasons other than the sporting event itself. For example, a college professor at an 
academic conference may buy a ticket to a local game, and therefore the ticket would be 
counted as a direct economic impact of the sports contest. The professor, however, would 
have come to the city and spent money on hotels and restaurants in the absence of the 
sporting match, and again the money spent at the game substitutes for money that would 
have spent elsewhere in the local economy.  
 Similarly,  ex ante estimates may be biased upwards if event guests engage in 
“time-switching,” which occurs when a traveler rearranges a planned visit to a city to 
  5coincide with a mega-event. It is possible that someone who has always wanted to visit 
Hawaii might decide to plan a trip during the Pro-Bowl. While the Pro-Bowl did 
influence the tourist’s decision about when to come, it did not affect the decision whether 
to come. Therefore total tourism spending in Hawaii is unchanged, and the Pro-Bowl 
simply affects the timing of such spending.  
  In the case of mega-events, the amount of new spending that is new to the 
economy is thought to be quite large in comparison to the total amount of spending, since 
these “premier” events are thought to attract large audiences from outside the local 
economy, many of whom come specifically for the event. As noted previously, the 
attendance at the 2007 Pro Bowl was 50,410, just over half of whom were estimated to 
have traveled to Hawaii for the game whereas only 5% to 20% of fans at a typical Major 
League Baseball (MLB) regular season game, for example, are visitors from outside the 
local metropolitan area (Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). 
  A second source of bias is “crowding out,” which results from the congestion 
caused by a mega-event that dissuades regular recreational and business visitors from 
coming to a city during that time. While a city’s hotels may be full of fans during the Pro 
Bowl, if the city’s hotels are generally full of vacationers or conventioneers anyway, the 
Pro Bowl simply displaces other economic activity that would have occurred. In other 
words, the economic impact of a mega-event may be large in a gross sense but the net 
impact may be small. Scores of examples of this phenomenon exist. As a case in point, 
during the 2002 World Cup in South Korea, the number of European visitors to the 
country was higher than normal, but this increase was offset by a similar sized decrease 
in the number of regular tourists and business travelers from Japan who avoided South 
  6Korea due to World Cup hassles. The total number of foreign visitors to South Korea 
during the World Cup in 2002 was estimated at 460,000, a figure identical to the number 
of foreign visitors during the same period in the previous year. (Golovnina, 2002)  
  A third source of bias comes from leakages. While money may be spent in local 
economies during mega-events, this spending may not wind up in the pockets of local 
residents. The taxes used to subsidize these events, however, are paid for by local 
taxpayers. The economic multipliers used in ex ante analyses are calculated using 
complex input-output tables for specific industries grounded in inter-industry 
relationships within regions based upon an economic area’s normal production patterns. 
During mega-events, however, the economy within a region may be anything but normal, 
and therefore, these same inter-industry relationships may not hold. Since there is no 
reason to believe that the usual economic multipliers are the same during mega-events, 
any economic analyses based upon these multipliers may be highly inaccurate.  
  In fact, there is substantial reason to believe that during mega-events, these 
multipliers are highly overstated, which overestimates the true impact of these events on 
the local economy. Hotels, for example, routinely raise their prices during mega-events to 
three or four times their normal rates. The wages paid to a hotel’s workers, however, 
remain unchanged, and indeed workers may be simply expected to work harder during 
times of high demand without any additional monetary compensation. As a hotel’s 
revenue increases without a corresponding increase in costs, the return to capital (as a 
percentage of revenues) rises while the return to labor falls. Capital income is far less 
likely to stay within the area in which it is earned than labor income, and therefore, one 
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leakages (Matheson, 2004). 
While ex ante estimates often do a credible job in determining the economic 
activity that occurs as a result of a mega-event and may also address the issue of the 
substitution effect by excluding spending by local residents, they generally do a poor job 
of accounting for crowding-out and almost never acknowledge the problems associated 
with the application of incorrect multipliers. For these reasons, numerous studies have 
looked back at the actual performance of economies that have hosted mega-events and 
have compared the observed economic performance of host cities to that predicted in ex 
ante studies.  Ex post analyses such as Porter (1999), Baade and Matheson (2001; 2004; 
2006), Coates and Humphreys (2002), Coates (2006), Coates and Depken (2006), Hagn 
and Maennig (2007a;2007b), Jasmand and Maennig (2007), and Baade, Baumann, and 
Matheson (2008), similarly uncover little relationship between hosting major sporting 
events and real economic variables such as employment, personal income, personal 
income per capita, and taxable sales. 
As noted previously, the HTA also suggests that sporting events serve to publicize 
Hawaii to prospective tourists. Sports fans may enjoy their visit to the city and return 
later raising future tourist revenues for the area. Corporate visitors, it is claimed, may 
relocate manufacturing facilities and company headquarters to the city. Television 
viewers might decide to take a trip to the host city at some time in the future based on 
what they see during the broadcast of the mega-event. Finally, hosting a major event 
might raise perception of the city so that it becomes a “major league” or “world class” 
city and travel destination. All of these claims are potentially true although little 
  8empirical research has conclusively demonstrated any long-run connections between 
hosting mega-events and future tourism demand, and there are not even any anecdotal 
examples of companies moving corporate operations to a city based on the hosting of a 
sporting event. The few studies that attempt to quantify the media effects of large events 
often derive benefits from the media exposure that defy credulity. One study of the 
Borussia Mönchengladbach soccer team in Germany asserted the value of a single 
national broadcast of a soccer match played in Mönchengladbach to be equal in value to 
twenty targeted 30-second tourism advertising spots directed to the same size audience. 
  While advertising benefits to mega-events certainly exist, two caveats must be 
mentioned. First, the presence of a mega-event may bring with it intangible costs as well 
as benefits. For example, the publicity associated with a sporting event may not always 
place a city in a positive light. Following the riots that occurred during the National 
Basketball Association finals in Detroit in the early 1990s, the city’s national image 
basked in the glow of car fires and burning buildings rather than the goodwill associated 
with an NBA championship. The bribery scandal that surrounded the 2002 Winter 
Olympics in Salt Lake City certainly didn’t enhance the city’s reputation. Similarly, the 
international reputations Munich and Atlanta were tarnished by the terrorist events that 
occurred during the Olympic Games held in their respective cities. 
Finally, the HTA notes that these events improve the quality of life of Hawaii’s 
residents by allowing them opportunities to watch or participate in major sporting events. 
Again, it is clear that sports do bring some intangible benefits to local residents. As Rudy 
Perpich, the former governor of Minnesota, once quipped, “Without professional sports, 
Minneapolis would just be a cold Omaha.”  Similarly, while Hawaii is a tropical paradise, 
  9it is also small and isolated without the range of cultural amenities that other larger and 
more interconnected states offer. Of course, directly measuring these quality of life 
benefits is fraught with difficulty and academic studies are mixed on the subject. As 
noted previously, sports don’t appear to make local residents richer, but they may make 
them happier. Carlino and Coulson (2002) find that housing rental prices are higher in 
cities with professional sports teams indicating a higher willingness of buyers to pay for 
housing in cities with these amenities. Of course, cities with professional teams are 
generally larger metropolitan areas, which offer many other cultural attractions for which 
renters would also be willing to pay a premium.  
Contingent valuation studies of professional sports franchises (Johnson, 
Groothius, and Whitehead, 2001; Johnson, Mondello, and Whitehead; 2006), stadiums 
and arenas (Groothius, Johnson, and Whitehead, 2004), and mega-events (Atkinson, et 
al., 2008; Walton, Longo, and Dawson, 2008) also find that citizens are exhibit a 
willingness to pay for sports teams and events beyond simply purchasing tickets. 
Maennig’s (2007) ex post analysis of the 2006 World Cup in Germany similarly 
concludes that claims of “increased turnover in the retail trade, overnight 
accommodation, receipts from tourism and effects on employment [are] mostly of little 
value and may even be incorrect. Of more significance, however, are other (measurable) 
effects such as the novelty effect of the stadiums, the improved image for Germany and 
the feelgood effect for the population.” (Maennig, 2007, p. 1) 
 
The Data  
  10  The analysis of the economic impact of sporting events in Hawaii is problematic 
due to the annual nature of the events. Most ex ante analyses of sporting events are based 
on changes in the sports environment. For example, Coates and Humphreys (2002) and 
Baade and Matheson (2001; 2006) estimate the economic impact of all-star games and 
post-season play in U.S. professional sports by analyzing annual data, and their analyses 
rely on the fact that either by design or the random nature of team success, these events 
take place in different cities year after year. Therefore, these studies can estimate the 
impact of an event by examining a local economy in one year that an event is held in 
comparison with the next year when the big game is played in a different city. Similarly, 
Coates and Depken (2006) and Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2008) examine monthly 
taxable sales data and again rely on differences in the numbers or types of games played 
during specific months to estimate the impact of major sporting events on tax receipts. 
  Table 1 lists the events examined in this study: Pro Bowl, Hawaii Bowl, Hula 
Bowl, Ironman Triathlon and several golf events. These events are chosen because of 
their prominence and notoriety and due to the funding they receive from the HTA. One 
final sporting event is also included, the Honolulu Marathon, despite the fact that is does 
not receive direct funding from the state. This marathon attracts over 25,000 runners 
annually, including over 15,000 entrants from Japan, regularly making this race one of 
the ten most popular marathons in the world. The Honolulu Marathon Association 
estimated that the 2007 race generated $108.9 million in visitor spending. (Tsai, 2008) 
Table 1 also shows, however, that the major events held in Hawaii, take place annually 
and in the same month each year (although there is often some variability in the exact 
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measuring the economic impact of the major sporting events that take place in Hawaii. 
  However, Hawaii’s Department of Business, Economic Development, and 
Tourism provides daily arrival data. These data include arrivals at all Hawaiian airports 
and range from January 1, 2004 to May 18, 2008. Arrival data are split into domestic and 
international arrivals. Over the sample frame the average number of arrivals is 22,716 per 
day, with domestic arrivals typically accounting for three-quarters of all arrivals.  
These data offer two advantages over taxable sales data that are common to the impact 
analysis literature. First, daily data greatly reduce the amount of statistical noise 
compared to impact studies that use quarterly or monthly data. Second, a very large 
majority of visitors to Hawaii arrive by plane, which improves our measurement of the 
tourism effect of these sporting events. Indeed, Hawaii’s remote provides an almost 
unique opportunity to examine the effects of sporting events on overall tourism for an 
economy. Of course, while daily arrival data allow us to isolate the impact of the 
aforementioned sporting events, we cannot estimate the dollar impact, which is ultimately 
the most relevant indicator of economic success.  
 
The Model 
  In order to examine the impact of the individual sporting events on arrivals to 
Hawaii, we use intervention analysis on an ARIMA model as outlined in Box and Tiao 
(1975). Others have employed similar techniques to analyze a wide array of economic 
problems in sports including the effects of the most recent players’ strikes on MLB 
attendance (Schmidt and Berri, 2002; Matheson, 2006) and the impact of professional 
  12sports on taxable sales in cities in Florida (Baade, Baumann, and Matheson, 2008). 
Intervention analysis provides a formal test for the change in the mean of a series as a 
result of an exogenous shock at a specific point in time.  
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where yt
* is the first-differenced daily arrival in time period t, P is the number of lagged 
values of yt
* in the model known as the autoregressive (AR) dimension of the model, εt is 
an error term, Q is the number of lagged values of the error term representing the moving 
average (MA) dimension of the model, and zt is an independent variables representing the 
effect of various sporting events of other exogenous economic events such as natural or 
man-made disasters. D is the number of times yt is differenced to create yt
*. The model 
also includes a vector of monthly dummy variables (MSm) and a vector of daily dummy 
variables (DSd) to account for seasonal and daily differences in arrivals. The constant 
term is omitted because all months are included in MSm.  
Because the arrival data are non-stationary, we use the first difference of daily 
arrivals in our estimations. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests reject the 
existence of a unit root for the first differenced data. The autoregressive and moving 
average dimensions of the models are determined through trial and error testing. Only the 
optimal autoregressive and moving average structures, as determined by the Akaike 
Information Criterion, are presented in the results. Estimations performed on 
undifferenced data, which we do not report here, returned similar results, which suggests 
that the data are not “over-differenced.” 
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and the dates they were held.  For those traveling to Hawaii for any of these sporting 
events, it is uncertain when they would arrive. Because of the distance, it is unlikely that 
people would arrive the same day of the event. But it is unclear exactly when arrivals 
would increase prior to a sporting event. For example, golf tournaments typically have 
four rounds that are held over four days, and some have preliminary events prior to the 
first round. Also, it is likely many travelers arrive several days prior to the event to see 
some of the other attractions in Hawaii and to alleviate jet lag. Coates and Humphreys 
(2005) face a similar issue when estimating the novelty effect of new stadiums, and used 
a series of F-tests to determine the best specification. We begin as Coates and 
Humphreys (2005) by creating seven dummy variables for each event: a dummy for 
arriving one day prior, a dummy for arriving two days prior, and so on up to seven days 
prior.
1 Because we observe each event multiple times (either four or five), the model 
should identify any systematic net increase in the number of arrivals.  We also include a 
control for the 2006 Hawaii Earthquake, which occurred on Sunday, October 15
th. 
Because the dependent variable is a daily difference, each of these events is also 
differenced.  
Table 2 presents the model with seven dummy variables for each of the following 
events: Pro Bowl, other bowls (Hula and Hawaii), a golf event, Ironman Triathlon, 
Honolulu Marathon, and the Maui Marathon. We also present three specifications of the 
dependent variable: total arrivals, domestic arrivals, and international arrivals. Although 
not presented for brevity, daily, monthly, and yearly dummies are included in the model, 
                                                           
1 For four-day golf tournaments, we count backwards from the final round.   
  14so each coefficient can be thought of as a net difference from what is typical on that 
particular day, month, and year. Only two events produced statistically significant 
estimates: Pro Bowl and Honolulu Marathon. For brevity, we omitted the results for other 
bowls, golf events, Ironman Triathlon, and Maui Marathon, but full results are available 
on request. Coates and Humphreys (2005) take another step and perform a series of F-
tests to determine the ideal specification in terms of the number of pre- or post-event 
periods to include. We do the same, and the net impacts of the Pro Bowl and Honolulu 
Marathon (or any of the statistically insignificant events) do not change substantially with 
the inclusion of anywhere from 3 to 7 days of arrivals prior to each event. 
The Pro Bowl has a positive and significant impact on arrivals for each of the 
three days prior to the game. The largest positive estimate is about 2,593 and occurs three 
days prior to the game. This is almost a 12% increase in tourist arrivals from an average 
February day. The domestic and international specifications suggest the vast majority of 
these extra tourists are domestic travelers. Using only the statistically significant controls 
for arrivals in the three days prior to the event, the Pro Bowl appears to increase net 
arrivals into Hawaii by 6,725 visitors.  
The Honolulu Marathon, which is one of the world’s largest, also produced 
positive and significant net impacts for each of the three days prior to the game. The 
largest positive estimate is about 2,510 and occurs two days prior to the race. This is 
about a 10.7% increase from an average December day. Unlike the Pro Bowl, in this case 
the positive net impacts are primarily driven by international travelers. Again using only 
the statistically significant controls for arrivals in the three days prior to the race, we 
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magnitude as the Pro Bowl. 
  For both the Hawaii Marathon and the Pro Bowl, the “crowding out” effect is 
clearly evident. While there is little reason to doubt the HTA’s estimates that 27,000 
visitors attend the Pro Bowl, the arrival statistics indicate that only about 6,500 extra 
visitors arrive in Hawaii in the time period prior to the Pro Bowl. Either three-quarters of 
the out-of-state fans were coming to Hawaii anyway, despite the Pro Bowl, or roughly 
20,000 Pro Bowl fans displaced other tourists. Similarly, although the Honolulu 
Marathon attracts 15,000 Japanese runners, the net increase in arrivals in the period prior 
to the race is less than half this figure. 
Taking the idea of crowding out one step further, both the Pro Bowl and Honolulu 
Marathon also exhibit a statistically significant decline in tourism 5 or 6 (Honolulu 
Marathon) or 7 days (Pro Bowl) before the event. One possible explanation for this result 
is, again, that regular tourists are crowded out by sports tourists. Due to its distant 
location, regular tourists often spend periods in the state of at least one week. If visitors 
cannot find hotel accommodations during the following weekend after their arrival due to 
a sporting event, they are unlikely to make the choice to arrive in the previous week in 
the first place. These events may be replacing regular visitors planning on staying an 
entire week with sports visitors staying only for the weekend of the event, an outcome 
that would certainly negatively impact the economy. Including the statistically significant 
negative results in the week prior to the events reduces the net increase in arrivals for the 
ProBowl and Honolulu Marathon to 5,596 and 2,183, respectively. 
  16  It is fair to mention one caveat to the results presented here. It is impossible with 
the available data to determine whether any of the displaced visitors reschedule their trips 
to other weeks. It is theoretically possible that the Pro Bowl may increase tourism during 
periods other than the week of the game by displacing tourists from the week of the Pro 
Bowl to another time. Still, it is clear that crowding out is an obvious problem that is not 
typically addressed by ex ante economic impact analyses.   
 
Conclusions  
City and states often use spectator sports as a vehicle for economic growth. 
Hawaii has a government agency that is devoted to attracting, and in some cases, 
financing sporting events in order to increase tourism in the short term and to raise the 
state’s profile in the long term. Compared to other economic impact analyses, Hawaii 
offers an interesting case study because the availability of daily arrival data and the 
state’s remote location, which allows us to isolate the impact of hosting a variety of 
sporting events net of typical fluctuations in tourism.  
We find two events generate a positive and significant net impact on arrivals: 
Hawaii Marathon and Pro Bowl. The HTA spends roughly two-thirds ($5.3 million) of its 
budget for the rights to the Pro Bowl. Based on results presented in this paper, this 
investment results in between 5,596 and 6,725 extra tourists to Hawaii. In comparison, 
the Hawaii Marathon, which receives no direct funding from the HTA, attracts between 
2,183 and 6,519 extra tourists. Unlike the Pro Bowl, much of net tourism caused by the 
Honolulu Marathon is due to participants. While there are some costs and inconveniences 
  17associated with the Marathon, they are likely to be small in comparison to the Pro Bowl 
even before figuring the $5.3 rights fee million to bring the event to Hawaii.  
  Of course, the power of the NFL to extract higher rents from the HTA than the 
Honolulu Marathon Association despite the fact that the race could quite reasonably 
make the claim that it brings in a similar or higher number of visitors should come as no 
surprise to economists. Unlike the NFL’s control over its brand, no single organization 
can claim a monopoly on the distance of 26.2 miles, the length of a marathon. Even 
though we ultimately cannot quantify the dollar effect of these sporting events, it seems 
apparent that the Marathon is a bargain compared the large investment necessary to bring 
the Pro Bowl to Hawaii. 
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Table 1: Event Dates 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Football       
Pro Bowl (NFL)  Feb.8  Feb.13  Feb. 12  Feb. 10  Feb. 10 
Hula Bowl (NCAA)  Jan. 17  Jan. 22  Jan. 21  Jan. 14  Jan. 12 
Hawaii Bowl (NCAA)  Dec. 24  Dec. 24  Dec. 24  Dec. 23  - 
Golf       
Mercedes-Benz 
Championship 
Jan. 8 – 
Jan. 11 
Jan. 6 – 
Jan. 9 
Jan. 5 – 
Jan. 8 
Jan. 4 – 
Jan. 7 
Jan. 3 – 
Jan. 6 
Sony Open  Jan. 15 – 
Jan. 18 
Jan. 13 – 
Jan. 16 
Jan. 12 – 
Jan. 15 
Jan. 11 – 
Jan. 14 
Jan. 10 – 
Jan. 13 
Mastercard Championship  Jan. 22 – 
Jan. 25 
Jan. 20 – 
Jan. 23 
Jan. 19 – 
Jan. 22 
Jan. 18 – 
Jan. 21 
Jan. 17 – 
Jan. 20 
Turtle Bay Championship  -  Jan. 27 – 
Jan. 30 
Jan. 26 – 
Jan. 29 
Jan. 25 – 
Jan. 28 
Jan. 24 – 
Jan. 27 
Wendy’s Champions Skins 
Game 
Jan. 29 – 
Feb. 1 
Feb. 3 – 
Feb. 6 
Feb. 2 – 
Feb. 5 
Jan. 11 –  
Jan. 14 
Jan. 21 –  
Jan. 24 
SBS Open  -  Feb. 23 – 
Feb. 26 
Feb. 15 – 
Feb. 18 
Feb. 14 – 
Feb. 17 
Feb. 13 – 
Feb. 16 
Fields Open   -  -  Feb. 22 – 
Feb. 25 
Feb. 21 – 
Feb. 24 
Feb. 20 – 
Feb. 23 
marathons/distance         
Honolulu Marathon  Dec. 12  Dec. 11  Dec. 10  Dec. 9  - 
Maui Marathon   Sep. 19  Sep. 18  Sep. 17  Sep. 16  - 
Ironman Triathlon  Oct. 16  Oct. 15  Oct. 21  Oct. 13  - 
 
Note: The sample frame is from January 1, 2004 to May 18, 2008, which predates the 
2008 Hawaii Bowl and any of the 2008 marathons/distance competitions.  
 
  23Table 2: Results  
 
 Arrivals  Domestic  International 
Pro Bowl, arriving   1644.990
** 1324.702
** 61.760 
 one day prior  691.913   578.885  411.230 
Pro Bowl, arriving   2488.252
** 2188.193
** 106.070 
two days prior  1022.774  993.264  406.639 
Pro Bowl, arriving   2592.887
** 2354.060
** -11.210 
three days prior  1176.258  1116.841  527.628 
Pro Bowl, arriving   1506.319  1668.760  -340.971 
four days prior  1283.392  1292.500  444.601 
Pro Bowl, arriving   597.149  617.630  -199.439 
five days prior  842.998   1478.277  356.295 
Pro Bowl, arriving   -173.118  -512.118  234.773 
six days prior  731.093   492.684  416.741 
Pro Bowl, arriving   -1129.745
** -836.494
** -389.660 
seven days prior  476.365   328.084  406.893 
Honolulu Marathon,   2444.159
*** 195.128 1905.783
***
arriving one day prior  371.263  342.959  373.459 
Honolulu Marathon,   2510.093
*** -289.422 2565.808
***
arriving two days prior  622.667  574.328  549.844 
Honolulu Marathon,   1565.117
** -617.865 2104.550
***
arriving three days prior  788.391  748.180  488.145 
Honolulu Marathon,   -521.388  -1520.288
* 967.460
**
arriving four days prior  802.512  877.828  393.638 
Honolulu Marathon,   -2538.379
*** -2409.535
** -89.663 
arriving five days prior  882.167  1021.849  352.286 
Honolulu Marathon,   -1797.939
* -1506.344 -221.281 
arriving six days prior  995.278  1084.790  380.825 
Honolulu Marathon,   -631.369  -788.673  221.964 
arriving seven days prior  731.718  846.106  453.460 
2006 Hawaii   -7014.407
*** -6057.394 -951.434 










    0.050 0.048 0.056 




    0.034 0.033 0.026 
log  Likelihood  -13563.24 -13245.59 -12542.14 
 
Note: Dummy variables for each month and each day except Wednesday are included but 
not presented here. In addition, 
*, 
**, and 
*** represent statistical significance at the ten, 
five, and one percent thresholds, respectively.  
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